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Over the years a considerable amount of attention has
been paid to the problems associated with the external
enlargement of the European Union and the so-called
democratic deficit that seemed to appear when the
integration was deepened. Many have warned that the
Union, in order to be efficient, must be reorganised and
able to function differently when the number of Members
States increases.
However, there is also a parallel development,
although perhaps less noticeable, in the debate affecting
the functioning and legitimacy of the European Union
– the new role played by the intermediate level of
government. To put it in more drastic terms: those who
expect the Union to comprise some thirty states in ten to
twenty years time, may to their surprise find that in
reality they will number
more than sixty, should
the dreams and hopes
of the more separatist
interests in some of the
present Member States
come true. The
plausibility of this
scenario is of course
debatable.
Nevertheless, what is
true is that intermediate-
level governments and
some local governments
are striving for
developments which
place new demands and stresses on the structure of the
EU decision-making procedure and on the integration
process as a whole. However, it is also important to
point out that this is not only a one-way process, where
the intermediate level tries to influence the EU
institutions. The interaction is very much encouraged
by the EU institutions and the consequences are not only
felt by them but also by national governments. In fact,
the Treaty of Maastricht explicitly gave sub-governments
(i.e. intermediate and local governments) a new and
more pronounced role in the integration process, and the
establishment of the Committee of the Regions (CoR)
was seen as an important manifestation of their new
status.
Furthermore, it is important to remember that the
empowerment of sub-governments in many countries
has not primarily been
motivated by demands
formulated at the Euro-
pean level. Instead it
has been a way for some
Member States to
address their own
domestic legitimacy
problem – as support
for and the construction
of the welfare state has
come under pressure
from an increasingly
critical public. In short,
both the national and
the European
developments put new demands on the organisation of
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Abstract
In recent years, many of the Member States have experienced dramatic changes in the organisation of their intermediate-
level governments, while new ways and channels have been established to enhance the interaction between the
intermediate level and the EU institutions. The conditions for what can be described as multi-level governance are
changing, and empowered intermediate-level governments are increasingly putting further and new demands on the
functioning and organisation of the European Union and its institutions. In this article an overview is given of how the
intermediate level of government in the Member States has changed and some of the problems connected with this.
Furthermore, different types of interaction between the intermediate level and the EU institutions are examined.
What we see in many Member States today is a situation in which new ways of organising the intermediate level of
government have been introduced with the aim of improving efficiency and democracy, while old ways are maintained.
Therefore, the intermediate level is becoming increasingly complex. In some unitary states the development is heading
in a “federal” direction, whilst federal states seem to be embracing the federal character of government even further. But
it is a rather strange type of “federalisation”, since in the same country both the degree of autonomy given to different
geographical areas and the way in which these new intermediate-level governments are organised may differ quite
substantially.
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intermediate-level governments and the structures
created to facilitate interaction between the intermediate
level in different countries and the European institutions.
Thus, this article focuses on two basic questions: what
types of intermediate level of government do we find in
the Member States in terms of how they are organised,
and where are they heading? Furthermore what kind of
structures (channels) have been created to promote the
interests of the intermediate level of government in the
European arena. These are two questions that will lay
the ground for a discussion about internal instead of
external enlargement and of surplus instead of deficit.
But before going into further detail, a more fundamental
question has to be answered – what is the intermediate
level of government?
Regions, Mesos or the Intermediate Level of
Government
The governments of nation states are often described in
terms of central and local governments, but these two
concepts are usually insufficient if a complete picture is
to be painted of how a nation state is organised and
structured. In most countries we tend to find structures
and organisations that are important elements of the
national government and its administrative systems,
although they cannot easily be classified as part of either
the central or the local government. These structures
have different names in different countries: for example,
we have something called autonomous communities in
Spain; regions and communities in Belgium; regions in
France and Italy; Länder in Germany and Austria; and
provinces in the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Spain.
County councils exist in most of the Nordic countries
and in the United Kingdom. In Greece prefecturial self-
government is the second tier of local government, and
regions are administrative units, although rather
independent, of the state. In France and Sweden there
are prefect systems and in Finland a lot of municipal
associations, just to give a few examples.
Of course, some of the problems with the different
names are to do with how to translate a concept into the
language of another country. However, it also
demonstrates a more genuine problem – there are in fact
very few public administrative structures at the
intermediate level that are similar when different
countries are compared.
Today, the concept of the region is often used as a
description of structures that are not part of central or
local government. This kind of approach tends to neglect
the fact that state regional administrative units (decon-
centrated administrative systems) can play quite an
important role as actors in the regional arena. Another
concept, “meso”, is sometimes used to describe structures
that do not clearly belong to central or local government.2
The problem with the meso concept is, however, that it
tends to overlook the creation of new administrative
structures formed through cooperation between
municipalities, of which municipal associations are an
example.
In order to stress that state regional administrations,
as well as municipal associations, can be an important
element in the regional administration of a country, the
concept of the intermediate level is used in this article.
This concept therefore not only includes public
administrative structures, such as different types of
regional government, but also deconcentrated state
ministries or agencies at the regional level and different
types of municipal associations. The intermediate level
is, in other words, something geographically smaller or
below the central state but at the same time something
bigger than, or above, the basic level of local government
(municipalities).
With this rather broad definition of the concept of
the intermediate level one should not be surprised to
discover that the intermediate level exists in almost
every country, at least in all those that are members of
the European Union. Even in those European countries
that are often thought of as having no trace whatsoever
of a regional government – Luxembourg, Portugal,
Ireland, and to some extent Finland before 1995 and
Greece before 1996 – it is possible to identify some kind
of intermediate level structure. In a small country like
Luxembourg, the intermediate level consists, for obvious
reasons, mostly of municipal associations. However,
visibility does not depend on the size of the country.
Denmark, one of the smaller countries of Europe
geographically, has no less than 14 county councils.
Different types of intermediate-level governments
One of the problems of defining the intermediate level
is that intermediate level administrations and
governments are constructed in very different ways and
for a variety of reasons. In principle, however,
intermediate level structures can be organised in three
different ways.
To begin with, intermediate administrations can be
set up by the central government. These regional state
administrations can in turn be of three different types. In
many countries certain ministries or central agencies
have their own administration at intermediate level
which controls and complements the work done by local
units. In other countries, the ministries or agencies do
not have separate administrative units at the intermediate
level, but the administrative tasks of different ministries
are carried out by a central (concentrated) administrative
unit led by a prefect, who is appointed by the government.
However, to complicate the picture a bit further there
are examples where two or three ministries cooperate in
a joint intermediate administrative unit outside the
control of the prefect (or in countries that do not practise
the “prefectorial” system). This third type rarely exists
on its own, and usually either the prefectorial or the
functional model is the predominant one. But it is also
common to find some kind of a mixture between two or
three of these models. To summarise, the organisation
of the state administration at the intermediate level can
be concentrated, semi-concentrated or fragmented.
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another way in which the intermediate level is formed,
is when local governments create intermediate level
governments or administrations. Basically, this can be
done in two different ways. For example, it is quite
common for two or more local governments to cooperate
and set up a common administrative unit for delivering
specific services – so-called municipal associations.
Intermediate-level structures are also created by local
governments when
these authorities are
responsible for
appointing members to
intermediate-level
assemblies. In
comparison with
municipal associations,
regional assemblies
usually have a broader
responsibility and cover
a wider range of issues.
In many countries both
models can be found
with local governments creating intermediate levels
both through mutual cooperation on specific services
and by being the responsible institution for indirect
elections to assemblies.
Finally, there is a third way in which structures of the
intermediate level are created, and that is of course by
direct general election. The residents of a certain area
(region) may have the right to elect an assembly, and in
some cases even the executive, with a certain degree of
home rule. This parliament at the intermediate level can
be organised and function in a very similar way to the
one at the central or local level. However, it is not
unusual for the parliament at the intermediate level to
deviate in important ways from the central or local
government.
In most countries one of these three principles
dominates. Firstly, the intermediate
level may be set up and controlled
by central government. Secondly, it
may be controlled bottom up by
local government, or thirdly, it may
be given a mandate directly from
the residents of a certain area.
However, it is also true to say that in
most countries we again find some
kind of mixture of these principles.
There are countries, for example,
where there has been a merger
between a previous prefectorial
system and a regional government
controlled by a directly elected as-
sembly. In these cases the directly
elected intermediate level of
government has been given the task
of deciding on and executing matters
on behalf of the central government,
while at the same time it enjoys a
high degree of autonomy and the right to make its own
decisions.
There are many more examples of different
combinations, and the overall structure of the
intermediate level can be extremely complex. One
reason for this complexity, as the example above
indicates, is the historical dimension. The intermediate
level was not created at any one time, and changes at that
level are not made
without the strong
influence of the past.
The problems of
organising the
intermediate level of
government
There are of course
many problems
connected with how the
intermediate level is
organised in different
countries and, as was
said at the beginning of this article, it is certainly
difficult to find countries with similar intermediate level
structures. The development at the intermediate level is
to some extent the organisational response to problems
and demands that are created elsewhere. For example,
in some countries, where it has been difficult to merge
small local governments into bigger ones, the creation
of an intermediate level has been seen as a solution to
this problem. However, since the government and
administration of a country is a comprehensive system,
what is seen as a solution in one part of that system may
well turn out to be a problem in another part. It is
therefore relatively easy to point out some of the problems
resulting from the present development of the
intermediate level. First of all, if the intermediate level
is fragmented there will be, as is already obvious in
What is remarkable is not the mere
existence of many different types of
intermediate structures within one
country, but their sheer proliferation.
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some countries, rivalry and competition between the
different types of administrative units, and new problems
and demands for coordination will soon arise.
The complex nature of the intermediate level will
also be a problem when more cooperation between
different intermediate levels in different countries is
demanded. Who is going to co-operate with whom,
when the same types of issues or functions are handled
by different types of intermediate-level structures in
different countries?
There are also interesting differences between
different levels within the countries themselves. In
almost all of the Member States, the government at the
intermediate level is organised in a rather different way
from that at the central level. In contrast to the United
States for example, where the organisational model at
the state level is more or less copied at the federal level,
none of the countries in the Union, with the exception
perhaps of Spain, use the same organisational principal
at the central as at the intermediate level. In Germany,
for example, we find a two-chamber system at the
federal level but a one-chamber system at the Länder
level. In parliamentary systems, the parliamentary
principal of a strict division between the ruling side and
the opposition is often not applied in directly elected
intermediate level
structures.
Furthermore, a
relatively new
phenomenon is that the
intermediate level in
certain regions of a
country may have a
different degree of
autonomy vis-à-vis the
central government to
that in other regions. In
the past, exceptions
such as the Åland
Islands, Madeira and
the archipelagos of the Azores, had a larger degree of
autonomy, but generally speaking the administrative
units that made up the intermediate level of government
in a country were organised in more or less the same way
and had the same competences. Today this is not neces-
sarily so. In Spain for example, some regions have
greater autonomy than others, in the U.K. the newly
elected Scottish parliament has a greater scope of
competence than the Welsh assembly and in Sweden
some areas have been allowed, as an experiment, to
organise a new type of intermediate level of government.
In some countries a type of democratic dilemma also
seems to exist – the imbalance between political
legitimacy and the tasks the intermediate level is asked
to perform. In some cases when intermediate levels are
created they are given a lot of political legitimacy by the
use of direct elections to regional assemblies, but
subsequently this newly created structure is given rather
limited responsibilities, which in the long run tend to
create tensions either between the central and the
intermediate level or between the local and the
intermediate level.
However, what is remarkable is not the mere
existence of many different types of intermediate
structures within one country, but their sheer
proliferation. It is rather tempting to name this
phenomenon “The surplus of the intermediate level in
Europe”. This may ring a bell to those who are familiar
with the debate about the democratic deficiencies of the
European Union. However, although this expression
may allude to the democratic debate on the EU, it is
important to point out that what we are primarily stressing
here is not a democratic surplus but rather an or-
ganisational surplus. There are, however, also democratic
problems connected with this organisational surplus to
which I shall shortly return. But let us first conclude that
the surplus of the intermediate level seems to go both in
a vertical – as new levels are built above or below the old
intermediate levels – and in a horizontal direction – as
a new type of administrative units are created at the
same level as the old intermediate level.
In short, new structures are created without removing
old ones. Finland is a good illustration of this devel-
opment. Although the provincial state offices (county
administrative boards)
in Finland were reduced
in number from twelve
to six, a new kind of
intermediate level has
emerged through the
instalment of nineteen
so-called regional
councils. And in
countries like Denmark
and Norway3, where the
county councils
virtually took over all
of the duties of the
county administrative
boards many years ago, these boards still exist and have
proven themselves to be remarkably skilful in finding
new duties to fulfil. In countries like France, Spain and
Italy the intermediate level has developed more along
the vertical dimension as new levels have been added to
the old ones, while Belgium seems to be the best
illustration of how the development of the intermediate
level can move both in a vertical and a horizontal
direction at the same time.
A quick look at almost any of the Member States
shows how complex the intermediate level has become,
as old structures are kept while new ones are added. One
may ask how the public at large is able to understand
these new structures and how this development is
compatible with the basic democratic principle of
transparent government, which makes it possible for the
public to participate in controlling the government and
thereby fulfil their democratic rights and duties. But to
complicate the picture further, the intermediate level of
One may ask how the public at large is
able to understand these new
structures and how this development is
compatible with the basic democratic
principle of transparent government.22 Eipascope 2000/2 http://eipa.nl
government does not only operate in the national arena
– the European connection for example is becoming
increasingly important.
Structures and channels for interaction between
intermediate-level governments and the EU
institutions.
In the eyes of the intermediate level of government, the
image of the EU as a system differs from the image of
the organisation at national government level. In the
beginning, as we all know, the European institutions
and structures were built for interaction between states,
not intermediate levels or local governments. Later, in
an attempt to pursue the integration of the Union further,
a direct link was created between the citizens of the
Member States and the EU institutions (a directly elected
parliament). That meant that for many years the
intermediate and local governments were more or less
in the same situation as all the private interest groups
and companies – their principal means of influence was
lobbying, either through the national government or
aimed directly at one of the EU institutions.
However, one of the more tangible results of the
Maastricht Treaty was the creation of a special body, the
Committee of the Regions (CoR) with the mandate of
fostering better communications and integration.
However, contrary to what happened when the people
became an actor in the Union by means of the Parliament,
the institution designed to handle sub-governmental
integration  – the CoR – was not made part of the
decision-making structure. It was only given an advisory
role.
But then, again, we find that when it comes to
decision making, intermediate-level government in
Belgium and Germany nowadays has the right to be
represented at certain Council meetings by regional
ministers, ministers representing linguistic communities
or  Länder, instead of being represented by federal
ministers. To an ever-increasing extent Germany and
Belgium, along with some of the other Member States,
also include officials from the intermediate level
government in their national
delegations and permanent
representations, allowing them to
participate in Coreper meetings and
the working groups of the Council.
Officials from intermediate-level
governments also have seats on the
Commission’s advisory committees
and other committees. The
distinction  – shown above – can
thus be made between channels with
direct access and channels with
indirect access to EU institutions.
Another difference can be observed
between channels with access to the
decision-making structure, and
channels only with access to
advisory bodies.
A key concept when analysing the intermediate
level of government and its relations with the European
Union is multi-level government. This contrasts with
inter-governmentalism, neo-functionalism or neo-
realism, which stress either the Member States or the
institutions of the European Union, or both, as the
essential elements in the European integration process.
The focus of a multi-level government approach is
mainly, but not solely, on how national and sub-national
governments interact with each other and with the
European institutions when European policies are
formulated. However, this approach often includes
actions taken by interest groups and other private
organisations. The multi-level approach could also be
described as network analysis, finding out how policy
networks are established through interaction between
several different actors. One of the characteristic traits
of this kind of network is the absence of hierarchies and
the interdependence of the actors.4 The aim of this
article is not, however, to describe these networks; the
focus is on finding the channels leading into them and
examining the decision-making arrangements which
facilitate the shaping of these networks – in other words,
asking how intermediate-level governments can access
this system in order to participate in the shaping of EU-
policy.
The regional offices5
One of the earliest arrangements, and probably still the
preferred method used by sub-governments to influence
the EU institutions outside the control of national
governments, is setting up regional offices in Brussels.
These regional offices can be put into at least three
different categories. Firstly, there is the case where a
regional office represents one region in one country, in
contrast to when an office represents all or several
regions in a Member State. Secondly there are regional
offices working to both a private and a public principle
(in terms of ownership) in contrast to those which only
represent either public or private interests. Thirdly, and
perhaps the most interesting, there is a difference between
those offices working for regions in only one country
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and those working for regions in two or more countries.
The regional offices working for regions in more than
one country are still very few, but they are widely
regarded a future model. There are of course also other
important differences to be found between the different
types of offices, some have for example vast economic
resources at their disposal which makes it possible for
them to employ a lot of specialists, while the smaller
ones only employ a handful of generalists. Some of the
regional offices are best characterised as “mini
embassies”, while others are rather “gathering places”
(regional houses) for a variety of interests such as
regional parliaments, regional executives, houses of
commerce and labour unions.
To conclude, some regions/Länder are quite happy
to invest a substantial
amount of money into
regional offices of their
own, while others do not
mind working with
regional offices
assisting several or all
regions of the same
country. There are also
important differences
between the Member
States. In Germany for
example every Länd
(region) has its own
office, while in other
countries only a few
regions have found it
worth the effort to invest
in an office of their own.
This point highlights a
potential problem, since rich regions will probably have
a structural advantage by being able to promote and
protect their interests better when decisions are
effectively being taken on the sub-governmental level
instead of by the national governments.
Paradoxically, the regional offices sometimes seem
to be more successful in creating close relations with the
EU institutions than in getting support from their national
governments. Although the original scepticism showed
by the permanent representations towards the regional
offices has largely vanished, there is still a long way to
go before the regional offices are regarded as really
important players by all national institutions in the law-
making process of the EU. However, when it comes to
implementing EU regulations the picture changes
somewhat, but also in this respect we find that national
governments like to play a decisive role.
The intermediate level of government of the
federal states and its participation in the EU law-
making process
A problem for federal or semi-federal states is that the
national level (federal level) does not have the
competence to take decisions in certain areas – in some
cases it is shared with the regional/state level and in
other cases it is exclusively the regional/state level that
has the right to take decisions. The federal structure has
therefore created a problem in some of the Member
States when the EU competence includes or affects
other areas than those exclusively submitted to the
federal level. The Länder in Germany have expressed
particular concerns over the possibility that the federal
level will usurp their autonomy and competence by
means of EU rules. However, the contrary seems to have
happened. The Bundesrat in Germany has increasingly
been given more power in EU matters, especially in
areas where the competence of the Länder is affected,
and special procedures for co-ordination between the
Länder have been developed outside the direct control
of the federal level in
order to be able to
formulate a common
opinion for the council
meetings.
The developments
in the four “federal
countries” – Germany,
Belgium, Spain and
Austria – have more or
less followed the same
pattern. Not only have
the regions/linguistic
communities/Länder
been given the
possibility of either
participating in the
working groups of the
Council and in Comi-
tilogy, or of sitting at
the table at Council meetings as negotiators or as part of
the national delegation, they have also been given
positions in the permanent representations. The fact that
a Member State can be represented by an official from
Länder or regional level instead of the national level has
had consequences for how these countries prepare their
common opinions for a Council meeting. In the federal
states or semi-federal states special arrangements have
been developed in order to co-ordinate the opinions of
the different regional/state governments before council
meetings. Belgium is probably the country with the
most elaborate machinery for this purpose. For example,
in a way similar to how the EU presidency rotates
between the different Member States, each region/
community in Belgium represents the nation (or assists
the federal representative) in matters that are not
exclusive to the federal level, on a six month basis.
However, the German Länder seem to be the sub-
governments that so far have made the most out of the
possibilities given to them to participate in different EU
settings.
The new arrangement laid down by Article 146 of
the EC treaty may give the impression that the
intermediate-level governments in federal or semi-
Rich regions will probably have a
structural advantage by being able to
promote and protect their interests
better when decisions are effectively
being taken on the sub-governmental
level instead of by the national
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federal states are given a structural advantage. However,
a closer look indicates that this has not yet been
manifested in practice. It is perfectly clear for example
that the intermediate level does not make use of the full
potential given to it to participate in different decision-
making bodies. But it is equally clear that the situation
of a federal or semi-federal system is different to that of
a unitary state, as a closer look of the intermediate level
of government in the Netherlands illustrates.
The role of the provinces of the Netherlands in EU
matters
Central government is still the most important channel
for influencing the decision-making process in the EU,
which is of course especially true for unitary Member
States. There are basically two ways in which the
intermediate level can influence the national
government’s stance on EU affairs – by lobbying national
governments, which then try to influence the decision-
making institutions of the EU – or by direct participation
in the work of the national government on EU matters,
including implementation procedures.
The provinces of the Netherlands have been given a
vast  – almost exclusive – responsibility for the
implementation of EU matters in areas where the EU
has sovereign or shared responsibility with the Member
States. This is the case for example with the regional
funds or environmental policy. Nevertheless, the
provinces seem to have rather limited influence when it
comes to the formulation of the Dutch government’s
position on new EU legislation. Of course, there are
always informal ways
in which individual
provinces can relay their
opinion on EU matters
to the government, but
so far no procedure or
arrangement has been
established giving the
provinces a platform to
express their common
interest on new EU
legislation. Thus there is a clear difference between this
system and that of the federal states. What we find is an
asymmetric relationship between influencing the
implementation procedure and the law-making
procedure. Changes may well be on the way, but so far
the provinces have not played an important role when
the Dutch government has formulated its policy on new
EU legislation – not even when the issues clearly
affected regional matters. The Dutch provinces have
also taken their time to establish regional offices in
Brussels – the first one was not operational until late
1994. A large proportion of the lobbying activities have
been carried out by an office common to all the provinces,
although in recent years offices have been established to
promote different parts of the Dutch territory. It can also
be noticed that the Dutch provinces also seem to lack
confidence in the ability of CoR to influence the EU
institutions – at least if one is to judge by the relative
absence of the Dutch delegates.
The Committee of the Regions (CoR)
What many would regard as the flagship of the new role
for intermediate and local levels in the EU structure, the
Committee of Regions, does not quite exert the influence
many expected it would when it was established. The
Committee of the Regions, comprising – despite the
name – representatives of regions and local governments
– has an advisory function, and is only asked to give its
opinion on matters which have particular consequences
for regional and local policies. How the mix of local and
regional representatives is achieved differs from one
country to another and in some cases we find that
representatives of the regional level dominate one
country’s representation while other counties have
achieved a certain balance. We also find different
“statuses” of the representatives in the CoR. Some
countries elect rather “well known names” to sit on the
CoR, while other countries have chosen more
“anonymous” representatives. However, there seems to
be an inverted correlation between fame and attendance
of the meetings of the CoR – the better-known names
participate considerable less in the meetings. Generally
speaking the attendance rate is not impressive, only
about 50 percent of the delegates are present on average.
Nevertheless, compared to the European Parliament
where about 30 percent of members are absent when the
parliament is in session, the difference is not that great,
and if we take into account that the CoR is an advisory
body, the attendance
rate could even be
considered fairly high.
However, so far it
has been hard to argue
that the CoR has had
any substantial
influence on the
integration process in
EU or on the more
important decisions
taken by the decision-making bodies of the union,
although the CoR has not been totally without influence.
Without doubt, the CoR has had problems in finding its
proper place in relation to the other EU institutions. Its
relations with the European Parliament for example
have been more or less non-existent, marked by rivalry
for some time now. Recently, initiatives have been
taken to improve the situation, but an accurate description
of the activities of the CoR would still probably be that
they are primarily directed at the Commission and the
Council. It is also probably correct to say that the CoR
has a more symbolic value, it is not yet an institution for
policy-making regarding EU matters – a reminder to
everyone of the intention to create an integration process
not only for central governments but also for sub-
governments. But it is not only when acting via the CoR
that the intermediate level finds it difficult to influence
The expectations created by the
Maastricht treaty have, so far, not been
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the integration process, this is also the case when dealing
with the European Parliament.
The European Parliament
Experiences drawn from national governments tell us
that it is possible to identify at least four different types
of channels or arrangements giving sub-governments
either direct access to the parliament or facilitating the
influence of sub-governments on the parliament:
constituencies, regional parties, accumulation of
mandates (dual
mandates) and
parliamentary com-
mittees. However,
when these four
dimensions are applied
to the European
Parliament the picture
that emerges is less
clear.
To begin with, only a few of the Member States use
more than one constituency in the elections to the
European Parliament, although all of them, with the
exception of the Netherlands, use more than one con-
stituency in national elections. But it is not primarily the
bigger states that use more than one constituency, the
smaller states such as Belgium and Ireland do this as
well. It is probably in these smaller states where
constituencies manage to play a role in bridging the gap
between the intermediate level and the European
Parliament. In the bigger countries with several
constituencies – the United Kingdom, Italy and to some
extent Germany – the constituencies tend to be quite
large, which probably makes them counter-productive
when it comes to creating bonds between the elected and
the electorate. Also, only in Belgium and Germany do
the constituencies to some extent follow the territorial
boarders of the intermediate level. Germany also gives
the political parties a choice as to whether to use more
than one constituency or not, and so far only the Christian
democrats in Germany have officially used more than
one constituency in nominating candidates for the
European Parliament elections.
Another way in which regional interests can gain
direct access to the European Parliament is through
regional parties. However, this is quite a rare
phenomenon and only in a few countries have regional
parties managed to get a seat in the European Parliament.
It will then come as no surprise that Belgium, Spain, the
UK and Italy have regional parties that have made it into
the European Parliament: countries where regional
parties also have a seat in the national parliament. Once
again Belgium is something of the odd man out since it
no longer has any national parties – all the parties are
regional. The number of regional parties and the number
of MEPs from regional parties from the other countries
is, however, quite small, so generally speaking one can
not say that regional parties are an important way of
channelling regional interests into the European
Parliament.
Two countries, France and Italy, are of special
interest where it concerns the use of dual (accumulation
of) mandates – i.e. the possibility of holding a seat in a
regional or local assembly at the same time as being a
MEP. However, it is questionable whether the dual
mandate system really is an effective way of creating
strong and influential channels into the European
Parliament. The MEPs with dual mandates seem to be
absent more often than not from the European Parliament
sessions and thus
should have some
difficulties in defending
the interests of their own
region. Finally, it has to
be said that it is not only
MEPs with dual
mandates who may
appear as spokesmen
predominately for just one region in deliberations and
decisions in the Parliament – any MEP can take on this
role.
How a parliament is organised is also of importance
in terms of the possibilities created for the intermediate
level to influence and connect to the national assembly.
Here the committee structure is of special importance
since it is much easier to influence policy areas that are
concentrated on one committee as opposed to those
divided among several committees. One of the largest
committees in the European Parliament is responsible
for regional affairs. However, in this case size does not
tell the whole story, since the very same committee is
not exclusively concerned with regional policy, but also
covers policy areas such as transportation and tourism.
Furthermore, other issues of importance for regional
policy such as agriculture are handled by other
committees.
A closer look at the national composition of the
Parliamentary Committee of Regional Policy,
Transportation and Tourism also reveals that it is not
primarily Member States with “strong” intermediate-
level governments that are over-represented in the
committee, something that would have been expected
had the committee been of any real importance in the
regional policy-making process of the EU. Instead we
find that Member States receiving considerable subsidies
from the regional funds have more seats than expected.
The general impression of the European Parliament
is that the structural arrangements to promote influence
and create links to intermediate-level governments are
rather weak. However, this does not exclude the
possibility that in some cases these channels have really
been of importance.
Conclusions
To summarise this article, the arrangements and channels
that have been created in order to enhance the influence
of the intermediate-level governments have played a
rather limited role so far, and it looks like the activities
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carried out by the regional offices may still in many
cases be the most important ones.
However, at the same time, the on-going integration
challenges our previous understanding of the inter-
mediate level and how it is organised. To begin with,
there is no clear demarcation between local and regional
government in the European setting, both for example
sit on the Committee of the Regions. Secondly, judging
by how some of the regional offices in Brussels are
organised, no clear distinction is made between private
and public interests either, since an office can have both
private and public owners. Thirdly, new means are
given and possibilities
open up to the
intermediate level
governments as they can
co-operate more freely
across national borders
outside the direct
control of the central
government.
The expectations
created by the
Maastricht treaty have, so far, not been met to any
significant extent. The Committee of the Regions is still
looking for its place in the EU decision-making process.
Furthermore, the channels which can be used by
intermediate-level governments to influence the
European Parliament have not been used to anywhere
near their potential. However, although what is
sometimes called multi-level government today still is
more about image-making than reality, it can be noticed
that the structural settings are different when
intermediate-level governments in federal and semi-
federal states are compared to non-federal ones.
Countries which once co-operated in the setting of
the EEC or EFTA with governments organised in rather
similar ways, now differ in important aspects. Some
states are both in theory and in practice federal or are
heading in that direction, while still others are keeping
up the appearance of being unitary states. Consequently
the prerequisite of the integration of states, the
intermediate level and local governments has
fundamentally changed. In the long run we can observe
how pressure is put on the EU institutions and structures
to adjust to these new conditions. But it is not only the
EU institutions that will be put under pressure to change
and adapt to the new situation, the intermediate level
will also be under heavy pressure to find new ways of
organising their activities. We can already see in the
more federal Member States how new co-ordination
procedures, outside the direct control of the federal
level or where the federal level is participating on equal
Could it be the case that ... federal
states come out on top in the EU
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terms as the intermediate level, are established in order
to co-ordinate certain EU-matters. In other words, the
intermediate level of government will sometimes find
itself in a situation where it is expected to represent a
whole country, and not only its own interests.
This observation leads to a final reflection. Could it
be the case that, in this new setting where the federal
level and the intermediate level unite to act in favour of
national, regional and local interests, that federal states
come out on top in the EU negotiations?
________________
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